Rank #1 of 59·Security·10 Nov 2026·AntiFox, an open-source agentic penetration testing platform (self-hosted by the attackers)
Attackers turned the AntiFox AI pentesting agent on real AWS accounts and pulled a production secret
“It knocked on every AWS door. One opened.”
- AntiFox: open-source agentic pentesting platform, first built as an ARTEX fork
- Attackers self-hosted it on Alibaba Cloud, Arctic Wolf says
- Hacked IIS app got an ASPX web shell; web.config secrets were harvested
- Valid IAM users and an assumed EC2 role probed dozens of AWS services
- Hundreds of API calls in ~30 minutes; most denied, some not
- A production secret was read; S3 objects were read, copied and deleted
An AI agent built to help defenders find holes was pointed at real companies instead. It broke into a web server, dug out passwords, then hammered AWS accounts until a production secret came loose.
What happened
AntiFox is an open-source, Chinese-language agentic penetration testing platform, first built as a fork of ARTEX, the agent tied to recent attacks on Korean banks. Security researchers at Arctic Wolf say attackers ran their own copies of it on Alibaba Cloud servers. In one intrusion the foothold was a hacked IIS web app: the web server process dropped an ASPX web shell, then ran commands to read web.config files, connection strings and app settings, and copied config and log files into a public upload folder. It also tried an internal production database with a password lifted from that config.
The damage
With valid AWS identities, IAM users and in some cases an assumed EC2 role, the activity sprayed List, Get and Describe calls across IAM, S3, Lambda, Secrets Manager, KMS, RDS, Bedrock and more. In one intrusion it cycled through several identities and fired hundreds of requests in about half an hour. Most got AccessDenied. Some didn't: a GetSecretValue call against a production secret succeeded, and elsewhere a valid identity read, copied and deleted S3 objects.
How it was caught, and what happened next
Amazon said AWS services were not compromised and worked as designed, and that the attackers used credentials taken from customers' compromised apps. The researchers say to kill unknown web shells and rotate every key and password that sat in config files.
The agent did nothing magic. It just tried every door, fast. Keep long-lived keys out of config files and give each identity only what it needs.

